Ideas from 'Natural Kinds' by Willard Quine [1969], by Theme Structure

[found in 'Ontological Relativity and Other Essays' by Quine,Willard [Columbia 1969,0-231-08357-2]].

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1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism

16943

Philosophy is continuous with science, and has no external vantage point

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry

16949

Klein summarised geometry as grouped together by transformations

7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff

16939

Mass terms just concern spread, but other terms involve both spread and individuation

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions

16948

Once we know the mechanism of a disposition, we can eliminate 'similarity'

8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent

16945

We judge things to be soluble if they are the same kind as, or similar to, things that do dissolve

14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment

16944

Science is common sense, with a sophisticated method

14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction

16941

Induction relies on similar effects following from each cause

16940

Induction is just more of the same: animal expectations

14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem

16933

Grue is a puzzle because the notions of similarity and kind are dubious in science

15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 7. Seeing Resemblance

16934

General terms depend on similarities among things

16938

To learn yellow by observation, must we be told to look at the colour?

16947

Similarity is just interchangeability in the cosmic machine

8486	Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped

19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates

16932

Projectible predicates can be universalised about the kind to which they refer

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds

7375	Quine probably regrets natural kinds now being treated as essences [Dennett]

16935

If similarity has no degrees, kinds cannot be contained within one another

16936

Comparative similarity allows the kind 'colored' to contain the kind 'red'

26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 3. Knowing Kinds

16937

You can't base kinds just on resemblance, because chains of resemblance are a muddle

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory

16942

It is hard to see how regularities could be explained